Just like https certificate authorities, the only way to fight all the AI slop will be “trusted” camera firmware that signs every image with a full chain of trust that the output was a real physical video taken will a real device at a real location.
Just like https certificate authorities, the only way to fight all the AI slop will be “trusted” camera firmware that signs every image with a full chain of trust that the output was a real physical video taken will a real device at a real location.
The article criticizes software Attestation which is valid criticism but if the Attestation happened in the camera chip itself and not at OS level then even a rooted system would not be able to cheat a certificate
A rooted phone could not, but anyone with a bottle of acid and a microscope could. Or as I’ve said, a nice optics setup and a high quality projector.
My point being that trusting the camera chip does not help much. But, of course, it would block the easiest software attacks like we have seen so far.